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Children’s Rights Implementation as a Multi-Level Governance Process 
 
Abstract: In this article, I suggest to view children's rights implementation as a multi-level 
governance process. I argue that a multi-level framework usefully integrates earlier work on 
norm compliance from International Relations (IR) scholarship and on norm vernacularization 
brought forward in Anthropology. Governance concepts move a step forward because they 
horizontally and vertically broaden the state-centric IR literature. After developing this multi-
level analytical framework, I introduce an in-depth case study on children's rights 
implementation in Bangladesh. This case demonstrates that particularly in weak states, where 
capacities are lacking, multi-level activities are relevant for transporting global norms to the 
societal local rights-holders. 
 
1. Introduction 
The world has commemorated the 25
th
 anniversary of the United Nations (UN) Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC) in November 2014. Only a month later, two children’s rights 
activists from South Asia, Malala Yousafzai and Kailash Satyarthi, have been awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize. Both laureates have “contributed to the development of important 
international conventions on children’s rights”1. Children’s rights conventions have indeed 
been path-breaking in several respects: on the one hand, they promoted the concept of the 
child as an individual and autonomous rights-holder. And on the other hand, they achieved the 
widest ratification rate among all human rights treaties in the UN system. But have they led to 
an overall improvement of the situation of those they were made for? Did they indeed initiate 
a change in the lives of the children themselves?  
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Reports published on a regular basis by specialized agencies of the UN working on children’s 
rights point to the fact that, at the grassroots level, children’s situation regarding education, 
health, nutrition or child labor is progressing very slowly; it is often stagnating or even 
deteriorating. Particularly in weak states, governments often fail to meet the complex 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfill that come hand in hand with ratifying human rights 
treaties. In this article, I will focus on how to understand (and overcome) the discrepancy 
between governmental acceptance of global human rights norms and societal compliance with 
these norms at the local level in weak states. Here, weak states are understood as states in 
which the government bears the monopoly of state power but faces serious limitations in 
exercising its functions pertinent to the rule of law, legitimacy and providing welfare 
services
2
. This means that weak states are characterized by a lack of capacity to domestically 
implement central decisions. Governing these areas of limited statehood, according to Risse, 
“[…] rests on the systematic involvement of nonstate actors […] and is ‘multilevel 
governance’, which links the local with national, regional, and global levels […]”3. 
The central research question dealt with in this article is under which conditions, with the help 
of what social mechanisms
4
 and under participation of which actors global children’s rights 
become effective for their local societal rights-holders. I point out that human rights 
implementation, comprising all steps between governmental ratification and societal 
compliance, is a multi-level governance process. After norms emerge at the international 
level, implementation has to take place at the national but also at the local level. A national 
implementation process is primarily directed at the norm addressees, i.e. the ratifying state 
government, whereas the local implementation process has to reach the norm targets, i.e. the 
societal rights-holders. National norm implementation has already been treated in greater 
depth within International Relations’ (IR) socialization and compliance research5. Yet, less 
attention was paid to local implementation processes. Although some work has been 
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published on norm localization
6
, only scarce research takes into account how these different 
levels – the global, the national and the local – are interlinked7. I argue that even norm 
localization processes are influenced by the agendas (and conventions) of international 
organizations (IOs). This means that a multi-level governance framework is best suited to 
comprehensively grasp rights implementation.  
In this article, I apply a multi-level governance framework to a case study on children’s rights 
in Bangladesh. Diving deep into the empirical material, I inductively generate hypotheses on 
relevant social mechanisms and multi-level actor cooperation to understand what happens 
after state ratification to reach the societal rights-holders. Children’s rights are particularly 
relevant for analyzing the research question raised because they clearly display the 
discrepancy between global norm ambitions and local realities. The CRC is known as the 
most widely ratified human rights treaty with 195 Member States accepting it as legally 
binding within their territory
8
. Nevertheless, current reports published by IOs concerned with 
children’s rights realization, like the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), demonstrate that the rights 
situation of children, especially in weak states, improves only slowly and is often stagnating
9
.  
Bangladesh is a typical case proving this discrepancy; its implementation problems are also 
representative for other country cases
10
. The South Asian state has ratified the most important 
children’s rights conventions and harmonized its national legislation accordingly11. A change 
of the children’s rights situation at the local level, however, only came into being very slowly. 
Policy programs launched by governmental or non-governmental organizations and targeted 
at the rights-holders, i.e. the children and their families or communities, played an important 
role for initiating this local change. In Bangladesh, a variety of children’s rights policies and 
programs, including projects of UNICEF, the ILO, the government, local NGOs and trade 
unions, are in place. It is also the only country case, in which UNICEF and the ILO (usually 
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following a different approach towards children’s rights) have cooperated in an exceptional 
project endeavor initiating a multi-level partnership for children’s rights implementation. 
Therefore, Bangladesh can be regarded as a unique case. The different implementation 
programs comparatively analyzed here can be understood as sub-cases of the case study. Due 
to the different approaches pursued in the programs, i.e. the establishment of micro-credit 
systems, the provision of informal education in community centers, the removal of hazards 
from children’s work places or the promotion of skills-training and self-employment, variance 
in the independent variables (mechanisms leading to societal compliance) is provided for. I 
mainly selected Bangladesh as a case study because it – compared to other weak states – 
displayed the greatest diversity in children’s rights programs and therefore, constitutes a case 
from which one can learn a lot
12
. In an in-depth empirical analysis, I will take a closer look at 
the successes gained from these programs and investigate how they came into being. 
Within the framework of process tracing
13
, I comparatively analyze seven programs initiated 
either by the government, by a non-governmental organization (NGO) or by an IO. The 
empirical analysis is based on data gathered from comprehensive field research in Bangladesh 
that I evaluated utilizing method triangulation
14
. The evaluation methods applied here 
comprise a qualitative content analysis of evaluation reports, of transcripts from expert 
interviews
15
 conducted with representatives from IOs, Bangladesh’s government and local 
NGOs, and of field notes from observing certain project components. I also interviewed 
children, parents and key community actors as the target group of children’s rights (and these 
projects) themselves. They, however, have been careful in voicing concerns about initiatives 
that were launched in cooperation with IOs or the government. Hence, the most valuable 
statements on local implementation could be gained from expert interviews with local civil 
society taking a key role in these processes. For comparing the seven projects, I applied a 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
16
. Thus, the methods employed also reflect the 
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multi-level and multi-disciplinary research framework. Whereas some of these research 
methods are typically utilized by Political Scientists and IR scholars, such as expert 
interviews, document and content analyses
17
, field observations or participatory methods at 
the grassroots level are rather applied by Anthropologists or Development Sociologists
18
. 
With the combination of both, a wide-ranging picture of children’s rights implementation in 
Bangladesh shall be drawn. 
In the following section of this article, I introduce major children’s rights conventions and I 
carve out the empirical discrepancy between high ratification rates of these treaties and an 
often stagnating rights situation on the ground. In a next step, I show that a multi-level 
governance framework is useful for comprehensively understanding this discrepancy by 
integrating important aspects of existing scholarship from IR and from Sociology, 
Anthropology and Development studies. Following upon that, I introduce the case study in 
which I have traced approaches of local rights realization including multi-level policy 
programs and actor constellations. Finally, I conclude by generating hypotheses that I 
introduce in a multi-level model on children’s rights implementation in weak states. 
  
2. The Discrepancy between Global Norm Ambitions and Local Change 
Global ambitions on child protection are primarily marked by three international conventions: 
the CRC, the ILO Minimum Age Convention (MAC) and the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labor 
Convention (WFCL). All of these instruments do not only comprise detailed legislative 
provisions but also stipulate flexible guidelines and principles
19
. The CRC adopted in 1989, 
for instance, contains concrete rights, like the right to education (Art. 28) and health (Art. 24), 
but also promotes broader principles, such as primary consideration of the best interests of the 
child (Art. 3) and the right to participation (Art. 12)
20
. These principles help to interpret the 
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convention and serve as guidelines for translating legal standards into national policies and 
implementation programs
21
.  
The MAC, adopted in 1973, also embraces a flexible approach: It demands ratifying 
governments to create their own national policy on an appropriate minimum age for taking up 
employment (Art. 1). This shall not be set below the age at which schooling is compulsory, 
not below the age of 15 years in developed countries and not below the age of 14 years in 
developing countries (Art. 2.3, Art. 2.4). Exceptions are formulated for light work, which in 
developing economies is already allowed at 12 years (Art. 7.4), and hazardous work, which 
can only be taken up at the age of 18 years (Art. 3.1)
22
. Within the range of these benchmarks, 
state actors can determine their own policy strategy.  
The youngest legal instrument in the global child rights regime is the WFCL that was adopted 
in 1999. This is the first convention that does not condemn child labor but places an emphasis 
on eliminating its worst forms. This relates to all economic activities that jeopardize 
children’s physical and mental development (Art 3.d). Whereas slavery and forced labor, the 
recruitment of children for armed conflict, pornography, prostitution and further illegal 
activities, belong to the unconditional worst forms, each Member State also has to define its 
own country-specific forms of hazardous child labor (Art. 4)
23
. This means, the convention 
invites ratifying states to create their own national policies concentrating on abolishing the 
worst forms of child labor. With this new consensus, the WFCL became the first instrument 
that was unanimously passed at an International Labour Conference. At the same time, it 
achieved the fastest ratification rate in the history of the ILO
24
.    
Ratification rates can be viewed as indicator for an acceptance of human rights norms, at least 
at an official level. The CRC is known as the rights instrument with the widest recognition. 
Today, 195 countries have legally committed to it
25
. The WFCL has received similar 
approval: 179 out of 185 ILO Member States have ratified it until today
26
. This ratification 
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boost also fostered further acceptance of the previous ILO child rights instrument, the MAC. 
It has – by now – been ratified by 168 ILO Member States27. Since the adoption of the 
WFCL, both ILO conventions have functioned like a tandem: states that ratified one of them, 
usually also ratified the other. 
Despite the fact that a broad global consensus pertinent to children’s rights treaties seems to 
exist
28
, an empirical gap between global ambitions and local realities can be observed. This is 
particularly true in developing countries. The UN, especially those organizational units 
concerned with child protection, UNICEF and the ILO’s International Programme on the 
Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), regularly deliver empirical data on the local rights 
situation proving this discrepancy. New global estimates on child labor published by IPEC, 
the program responsible for implementing the WFCL and the MAC, reveal that progress in 
eliminating child labor could be achieved. Nevertheless, there are still about 168 million child 
laborers, i.e. about 10 percent of the world’s children. Moreover, approximately 85 million 
children are still occupied in hazardous work that is detrimental to their physical and mental 
development
29
. Latest figures from UNICEF, the agency responsible for implementing the 
CRC, show a similar trend: There are improvements in the rights situation but these come at a 
very slow pace. In 2012, the estimated number of children who died under five years of age 
was still at 6.6 million
30
. Pertinent to education, UNICEF and UNESCO even declare that 
“[…] progress has stagnated […]” and that “the unfinished education agenda” needs to be 
addressed: Until today, there are still about 57 million children not enrolled in primary 
schools
31
. This empirical evidence is in line with established research in International 
Relations (IR) that considers human rights ratification as a “paradox of empty promises”32. 
In the following section, I will dive deeper into explanations for this discrepancy brought 
forward by International Relations scholarship and other disciplines engaged in childhood 
studies, such as Sociology, Anthropology and Development Studies. 
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2.1 Explanations from International Relations Scholarship 
In IR scholarship, norms are grasped as “[…] collective expectations about proper behaviour 
for a given identity”33. Human rights are particular types of norms that define the relationship 
between a state and its citizens – and that increasingly also regulate the behavior of business 
actors and NGOs
34
. Norm research in IR has pointed to conceptual differentiations between 
„norm adoption“ and „norm internalization“35 or between a „prescriptive status“ and „norm-
consistent behavior“36. All of these conceptualizations carve out the empirical difference 
between formally ratifying an international treaty and state actors behaving according to the 
norms anchored in this treaty. State actors do not necessarily have to be convinced of a human 
rights norm when they ratify it. Instead, they could merely demonstrate commitment due to 
external pressure, conditions for foreign aid or for advancing opportunities for international 
cooperation. Hence, states can de jure adopt a norm, without de facto respecting it. Whereas 
norm socialization research focuses on the adoption of international norms by governments, 
compliance research delivers more insights into mechanisms fostering adherence to these 
norms
37
. Therefore, research on norm compliance can provide useful explanations for the 
processes that advance conformity of both, state and societal actors, with international 
treaties. 
Compliance scholars start from the assumption that norms have already been adopted and 
concentrate on social mechanisms that guarantee obedience to these rules. Chayes, Chayes 
and Mitchell, for instance, “[…] use compliance to describe those instances when an actor’s 
behavior conforms to an explicit rule of a treaty”38. Factors advancing compliance are 
monitoring and sanctioning, juridification, and legal as well as civil internalization, but also 
discourse and persuasion
39
. Another important mechanism is compliance management. This 
includes capacity-building, the provision of administrative, technological and financial 
resources but also the delivery of relevant information. Among other sub-mechanisms that 
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have to be considered, effective cooperation between state and non-state actors play a 
significant role in compliance management
40
. In compliance research, there is a differentiation 
between mechanisms directed at state actors to foster rule conformity among norm addressees 
and mechanisms directed at society to foster rule conformity among norm targets. 
Participation opportunities in rule-making and the social acceptance of regulations are 
important mechanisms contributing to norm compliance within society
41
. Considering 
participation and social acceptance, however, is not enough for understanding local societal 
compliance with international (human rights) treaties. More about local societal processes 
towards compliance can be learned from scholarship originating in other Social Science 
disciplines. 
 
2.2 Insights from Anthropology, Sociology and Development Studies  
In childhood studies, an important bulk of empirical research has been conducted at the 
disciplinary intersection of Anthropology, Sociology and Development Scholarship. Various 
analyses investigating the situation of children in developing countries suggest that a 
comprehensive understanding of the local context is an essential prerequisite for 
implementing global rights therein. Scholars emphasize that global norms need „local 
emphasis, refurbishing and interpretation”42 to become meaningful in a particular context.  
Jo Boyden and colleagues argue that what is needed to design appropriate policies is not only 
a contextual knowledge of children’s reality, but knowledge provided by the children 
themselves
43
. In line with this argument, children are viewed as social agents shaping their 
own environment. Children shall be participating subjects who need to be personalized and 
individualized
44
.  
Although not concerned with the implementation of children’s rights but with the protection 
of women, the work of Sally Engle Merry has been path-breaking in explaining how global 
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rights become meaningful in local contexts. Merry introduces the concept of 
vernacularization as the adaptation of global norms to local communities, their institutions 
and their meanings
45
. Key to vernacularization processes are the agents that connect 
behavioral standards codified in international law with local realities. Merry refers to these 
intermediaries as people who engage at various levels. They can be activists of a social 
movement, lawyers, NGO leaders, academics or others that: “[…] have one foot in the 
transnational community and one at home”46. This means that they need to apply the language 
of IOs and external donors but, at the same time, reach out to the local norm targets. 
Intermediaries “indigenize” meanings; they make them comprehensible within prevalent 
cultural terminology, traditions, and practices
47
. Often, NGOs take the positions of 
intermediaries: they have legal expertise, they know the human rights system, the language of 
pertinent conventions
48
 and they have access to the local target populations. Their efforts 
become even more important in the absence of state commitment or lacking state functions.  
 
2.3 Children’s Rights Implementation as a Multi-level Governance Process 
In this article, I argue that both perspectives, i.e. compliance focusing on norm adherence by 
state actors and vernacularization emphasizing norm adaptation by society, can usefully be 
integrated into a multi-level governance framework. With James Rosenau’s pioneering 
definition, it has been suggested to grasp governance as: “[…] systems of rule at all levels of 
human activity – from the family to the international organization – in which the pursuit of 
goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions”49. This definition does 
not only emphasize different levels of human activity but also refers to various actors that 
might be relevant in the pursuit of goals – and these are governmental, e.g. international 
organizations, and societal ones, e.g. the family.  
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A multi-level governance framework offers two major advantages in the study of human 
rights implementation. First, it provides for horizontal and vertical diversification to the 
predominantly state-centric socialization and compliance scholarship in IR. The vertical 
governance dimension is strongly influenced by EU studies paying attention to governing at 
the supranational, national, regional and local level
50
. It is useful for studying rights 
implementation processes because here, competences and resources are also shared across 
territorial levels and actors operating at these various levels have to coordinate their 
decisions
51
. The vertical governance dimension points to a plurality of actors that carry out 
governance functions through less formalized and more flexible arrangements, partnerships, 
networks, and projects
52
. Non-state actors, like NGOs or even private businesses, become 
involved in providing public goods in a demand-tailored and efficient way whenever 
governmental institutions cannot meet the challenges of complexity in modern societies 
and/or lack the necessary capacities and resources like in weak states. Thus, a state-centered 
understanding of politics has shifted towards a society-oriented perspective in which non-state 
actors become meaningful protagonists. This society-oriented perspective is particularly 
relevant when considering how global human rights reach their local societal target group. 
Second, a multi-level governance framework underscores that governance levels and pertinent 
actors do not operate independent of each other. In contrast, they are mutually dependent and 
each level’s actors perform particular functions which points to at least “[…] some extent [of] 
functional differentiation”53. This means that a multi-level perspective moves one step beyond 
recent work on norm vernacularization and norm localization
54
. It highlights how – 
particularly in weak state contexts – local human rights implementation is influenced by 
multi-level policy programs and multi-level actor constellations
55
. Table 1 highlights this 
theoretical framework with a focus on multi-level processes that guide local implementation. 
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Table 1: Analytical Framework  
The Vertical Governance 
Norms 
The Horizontal 
Global Conventions Intergovernmental 
National 
 
National Implementation: 
(Constitution, Legislation, 
Policies) 
Governmental 
 
Local 
 
 
Local Implementation 
 Multi-level policy 
programs reaching out 
to the norm target 
group  
Local Actors and Multi-level 
Actor Arrangements  
 
 
3. Children’s Rights Implementation as Multi-level Process: An In-Depth Case Study  
The Government of Bangladesh (GOB) ratified the 1989 CRC in August 1990 and hence, 
belonged to the first signatory countries of the international community
56
. Furthermore, it 
legally committed itself to the 1999 WFCL, relatively soon after its adoption in March 2001
57
. 
As a consequence of ratification, Bangladesh initiated legislative reforms in order to 
harmonize national law with fundamental norms brought forward in both conventions. 
Following ratification of the CRC and signing the World Declaration on Education for All 
(also in 1990), the government adopted a national Primary Education Act during the same 
year
58
. Building upon that, it institutionalized a reformed primary school system, introducing 
obligatory primary education in the country
59
. These legislative reforms are also reflected in 
several policies relevant for education, among them the National Plan of Action I and II 
(1992-2000 and 2003-2015), several National Education Policies (the latest adopted in 2010), 
a National Plan of Action for Children (2005-2009) and a National Children Policy from 
2011. Governmental investment into the reformed primary education system rose enormously 
from 4.7 percent of total public spending in the fiscal years between 1993 and 1994 to 19.9 
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percent in the years between 1997 and 1998
60
. Within a period of two years, from 1992 to 
1994, the primary enrollment rate increased by 35 percent, with a particularly significant 
growth for girls of 44 percent
61
. The efforts of the government led to a primary school net 
enrollment rate of 93 percent for girls and 86 percent for boys
62
. This means that not only 
state actors comply with the right to education but it has also reached its local rights-holders, 
the children. Bangladesh will most certainly achieve the second Millennium Development 
Goal, i.e. universal primary education, until 2015. 
The right to health is similarly promoted by a multitude of policy strategies. The Fifth Five 
Year Plan (1997-2002) formulated the objective of ensuring universal access to quality health 
care services for all citizens of Bangladesh. Here, the need to reduce infant and maternal 
mortality and to improve their nutritional status was emphasized. Another five-year program, 
launched in 1998 as the Health and Population Sector Programme (HPSP), acknowledges 
adolescents as one priority target group. The HPSP made provisions for the delivery of an 
Essential Services Package (ESP) that comprises basic reproductive and child health services, 
including family planning, maternal care, and immunization
63
. 
After completing the ratification process of the WFCL in 2001, it took about five years to 
legally institutionalize the basic norms anchored therein. In the year 2006, the Bangladesh 
Labor Code was introduced, which finally harmonized and consolidated the bulk of partly 
controversial national labor laws in force. The Code, also known as the Bangladesh Labor 
Act, prohibits all forms of child labor under 14 years of age. It also protects youths over 14 
years from the worst forms of work
64
. In addition to the Labor Act, the GoB finally passed a 
National Child Labour Elimination Policy in 2010. This policy is a follow-up requirement of 
admission to the WFCL. The main objectives of the policy are to withdraw children from the 
worst forms of child labor, to engage their parents in income-generating activities, to offer 
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stipends for (re-)integrating children in schools and to raise awareness among society to 
eliminate several forms of child labor by 2015
65
.   
Prior to some of these crucial labor law reforms and the 2010 National Child Labour 
Elimination Policy, several policy programs fostering children’s rights at the local level had 
already been initiated. These will be analyzed in the following. Three fundamental norms 
stipulated in the CRC and the WFCL (and in the programs examined) are emphasized in this 
case study, namely (1) protection from the worst forms of child labor, (2) the right to 
education and (3) the right to health. Thus, projects were considered in the pool of sub-cases 
if they met at least one of the following indicators: (1) a targeted number
66
 of children was 
withdrawn from hazardous work places or the hazards were removed from their places of 
work, (2) a targeted number of children was provided with non-formal education and skills 
training or integrated into governmental schools, (3) a targeted number of children was 
provided with basic health care services. This means the definition (and operationalization) of 
success is focused on the societal rights target group, i.e. the children and their families 
themselves, and less on activities of the rights addresses, i.e. state actors adopting laws and 
policies.  
Altogether, seven sub-cases
67
 were comparatively investigated within the framework of a 
process analysis. These are: 
 the Child Labour Elimination Project: CLEP (initiated and realized by an NGO),  
 the Food for Education Programs: FFE and the consecutive Primary Education 
Stipend Project: PESP (both initiated and realized by the government), 
 the Eradication of Hazardous Child Labour: EHCL project (initiated by 
Bangladesh’s Ministry of Labour and Employment (MoLE) and realized by local 
NGOs), 
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 the Basic Education for Hard to Reach Urban Working Children: BEHTRUWC 
project (initiated by UNICEF in cooperation with the Ministry of Primary and Mass 
Education (MoPME) and implemented by local NGOs), 
 the Preventing and Eliminating the Worst Forms of Child Labour in Selected 
Formal and Informal Sectors in Bangladesh: ILO/IPEC USDoL
68
 project (initiated 
by the ILO and the MoLE and realized by local NGOs), 
 the Prevention and Elimination of Selected Worst Forms of Child Labour in the 
Informal Economy in Dhaka City: ILO/IPEC Net
69
 project (initiated by the ILO 
and the MoLE and realized by local NGOs), 
 and the Bangladesh Garment Sector Projects: BGMEA/ILO/UNICEF (initiated by 
UNICEF and the ILO, the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters 
Association (BGMEA), the MoLE and realized by NGOs).      
Table 2 summarizes how program success referring to children’s rights implementation was 
defined along the dimensions of output and outcome
70
. It presents implementation success as 
a four value set. Four value sets are used in QCA fuzzy set analyses to not only demonstrate 
in a dichotomous way what is “in” and what is “out”, but to be more precise in what is “more 
out than in,” “neither fully in nor fully out” or “more in than out”71. This is also helpful for 
defining implementation success among the sub-cases considered here. If only one indicator is 
met, the project is considered to be “less successful”. If at least two of three implementation 
indicators are met, the project is considered to be “more successful”. This decision has been 
made taking a human rights perspective into account. Due to the interrelatedness and mutually 
reinforcing character of human rights, those projects that do not only withdraw children from 
hazardous occupations but also provide them with viable education alternatives are considered 
to be more successful. Those programs that do not only deliver education services but also 
protect children from the worst forms of child labor and take care of basic health care at the 
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same time, are viewed to have the best effect on the children. Table 2 summarizes these 
considerations of implementation success also providing some concrete numbers regarding 
the outcome on the rights targets. 
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Table 2: Implementation Success of Policy Programs 
        Project 
 
 
Implementation 
Success 
CLEP  
 
 
FFE/PESP  
 
 
EHCL  
 
 
BEHTRUWC  
 
 
ILO/IPEC 
USDoL  
 
ILO/IPEC Net  
 
 
BGMEA/ILO/ 
UNICEF  
 
 
Output  
(according to 
indicators) 
(1) --- 
(2) provision of 
non-formal 
education 
and skills 
training 
(3) provision of 
basic health 
care services 
 
(1) --- 
(2) regular 
provision of 
governmental 
primary 
education  
(3) --- 
 
 
(1) withdrawal 
from 
hazardous 
child labor 
(2) provision of 
non-formal 
education 
and skills 
training 
(3) --- 
 
(1)  --- 
(2) provision of 
non-formal 
education and 
livelihood 
skills training 
(3) --- 
 
 
(1) withdrawal 
from 
hazardous 
child labor 
(2) provision of 
non-formal 
education and 
skills training 
(3) provision of 
basic health 
care services 
 
(1) withdrawal 
from 
hazardous 
child labor 
and 
workplace 
improve-
ment to 
reduce 
hazards 
(2) provision of 
non-formal 
education and 
skills training 
(3) provision of 
basic health 
care services 
(1) withdrawal 
from 
hazardous 
child labor 
(2) provision of 
non-formal 
education 
and skills 
training 
(3) --- 
 
Outcome (1)  --- 
(2) between 
2002-2008: 
1386 
graduates 
from NFE 
and 3144 
(1) --- 
(2) between 1993-
2008: FFE: 2.1 
million 
beneficiary 
students 
(2002), PESP: 
(1) indefinite 
number of 
children 
withdrawn 
from 
hazardous 
child labor 
(1) --- 
(2) between 
1997-2009: 
517,150 
children 
provided with 
non-formal 
(1) between 2000-
2003: 8,826  
children 
withdrawn 
from 
hazardous 
work and 353 
(1) between 
2001-2006: 
12,032 
children 
withdrawn
76
, 
200 
workplaces 
(1) between 
1995-2003: 
5,674 child 
laborers 
identified 
during child 
collection 
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from SDT
72
 
(3) indefinite 
number of 
beneficiaries 
make use of 
health care 
services 
 
 
5,5 million 
beneficiary 
students 
(2008);
73
increa
sed school 
enrollment, 
attendance and 
duration, 
reduced drop 
outs 
(3) --- 
 
(2) indefinite 
number of 
children 
provided 
with non-
formal 
education  
(3) --- 
 
education of 
which 
166,150 
received 
livelihood 
skills 
training
74
  
(3) --- 
 
child domestic 
workers with 
safer working 
conditions 
(2) 19,191 
children 
provided with 
non-formal 
education  
(3) 30,175 
children have 
received 
counseling, 
health and 
referral 
services
75
 
 
improved
77
 
(2) 20,000 
children 
successfully 
completed 
NFE,
78
 1,282 
children 
graduated 
from the old 
and 180 
children from 
the new SDT 
program
79
 
(3) health status 
and 
awareness of 
NFE and 
SDT 
graduates 
improved
80
 
drive in 
1996;
81
 
3,290 
children 
withdrawn 
from 
garment 
industries 
(from 1998 
on)
82
    
(2) 8,588 
children 
enrolled in 
NFE
83
 and 
about 2,035 
children 
absolved 
skills 
training
84
 
(3) --- 
Implementation 
Success  
more successful less successful more successful less successful successful successful more successful 
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Taking a closer look at the quantitative data provided in this table, one could, of course, argue 
that programs like the FFE/PESP reaching out to 5.5 million children cannot be categorized as 
less successful. This is true with respect to the right to education fostered through this 
initiative. At the same, field research at the grassroots level disclosed that education alone 
often does not improve the children’s rights situation comprehensively. Bangladesh, for 
instance, for a very long time faced a serious child mortality rate
85
 often related to 
malnutrition or other health issues. And if a child falls sick, it cannot attend school anymore. 
Thus, in this research project implementation success was defined in this multi-dimensional 
way focusing on the three major rights mentioned above.  
In the following, a systematic comparison of programs strategies will be presented which 
constitutes the empirical basis for generating hypotheses on local rights implementation. It is 
important to note that the comparison takes the relative success of the programs into account 
using Boolean Algebra
86
. Hence, similarities and differences regarding (1) infrastructure and 
institutions, (2) social mechanisms and (3) actors (with a focus on necessary and sufficient 
conditions) will be outlined. The empirical results will be presented in a qualitative 
description here – fleshed out with illustrative examples from the respective projects. 
 
3.1 Infrastructure and Institutions 
A necessary condition for local rights implementation in a weak state like Bangladesh is the 
establishment of an infrastructure through which rights-related education and health services 
can be delivered to the children and their parents. All of the projects analyzed here set up an 
infrastructure, except for the FFE/PESP programs, which distributed food and stipends in 
already existing governmental and non-governmental schools.  
Before the respective programs were launched in Bangladesh such an infrastructure was often 
missing, particularly in disadvantaged rural and urban areas, in which the rights of children 
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were also neglected. Here, the state lacked the required resources and capacities to build up 
schools or hospitals
87
. As a consequence, all of the programs investigated (except for the one 
reverting to existing schools) commenced their initiatives with establishing so-called 
community learning centers in their respective target areas
88
. Through these centers they 
could, in a second step, offer certain rights-relevant social services, such as non-formal 
education
89
, vocational training, but also immunizations, the supply of medicines and 
nutrition support, especially for working children and their families. The program initiated by 
UNICEF (BEHTRUWC), for instance, managed to set up 6646 learning centers in the urban 
slums of all of Bangladesh’s seven big cities, i.e. Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, Barisal, 
Rashjahi, und Sylhet between 2005 and 2012
90
.  
The need for infrastructure in remote areas is, of course, not new to development research; a 
new result of this case study is rather how provisional and cost-effective it can be. In the sub-
cases analyzed, local implementing NGOs familiar with the target areas searched for rooms or 
buildings in the urban slums and rented these as school centers. One interesting example is 
offered by the governmental EHCL program: Within its framework, working children met in 
very simple rooms or bamboo huts that were – due to lacking space in Hazaribagh, an urban 
slum in Dhaka – fixed above the Buriganga river. In these centers, the children sat on the 
floor and learned informally in flexible shifts according to their working hours. Hence, it did 
not take lots of resources to introduce these children to their first learning experiences.  
Simultaneously to the establishment of this ‘hard’ infrastructure, i.e. the learning centers, new 
forms of ‘soft’ infrastructure, i.e. local institutions, were formed to manage service delivery. 
All of the seven programs investigated in this case study built up local committees in their 
centers. These committees were comprised of local government representatives, social 
workers, parents and sometimes even the employers of child laborers. It could be meaningful 
to also integrate religious leaders, like the Imam or the Mullah, or other elites from the 
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community
91
. In this way, the service-delivering center and institutions became embedded 
into local societal structures to foster “local ownership”92. By constantly dealing with the 
social norms related to the services offered, rights consciousness of the entire community was 
fostered. Empirically, this became observable when community committees resumed their 
work even after the externally funded projects had terminated, when they mobilized resources 
beyond funding periods and when they continued to multiply the message of children’s 
rights
93
. In almost all of the project initiatives, namely CLEP, FFE/PESP, EHCL, 
BEHTRUWC, ILO/IPEC Net and ILO/IPEC USDoL, indicators for norm consistent 
community mobilization and local ownership could be observed.  
Hence, a first empirical insight of this case study is that the establishment of a local 
infrastructure for the delivery of rights-related social services and the formation of community 
institutions are necessary conditions for achieving norm compliance. 
 
3.2 Socialization Mechanisms 
A further central result of the case study is that a certain configuration of mechanisms needed 
to be installed to promote norm socialization. The term mechanism will be used in accordance 
with the research program of ‘international socialization’ within IR scholarship here. Thus, 
mechanisms allow for fine-grained explanations on an analytical level below a comprehensive 
theory
94
. 
In Bangladesh, all of the programs considered have utilized forms of targeting. The FFE and 
its successive PESP programs applied a particularly sophisticated two-step targeting 
approach. In a first step, economically disadvantaged rural areas, so-called ‘thanas’95, with 
low education rates were selected. Within these thanas, a household level selection was 
carried out as the second targeting step; it was relevant to find families with children of 
primary school age who own less than half an acre of land, whose main income earner is a 
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day laborer, and whose household is female-headed or dependent on low-income occupations, 
such as fishing, pottery, smithery, weaving or cobbling
96
. By applying targeting mechanisms, 
rights-relevant services, could be directly catered to the neediest children. 
Six out of the seven programs worked with advocacy and awareness-raising strategies. 
Within the framework of the CLEP program, for instance, NGO representatives made use of 
posters and brochures, but also commenced rallies, workshops and roundtable discussions to 
explain the meaning of children’s rights to the local communities. They even initiated a 
‘Child Rights Forum’ that could be used as a platform for discussion and exchange regarding 
rights realization and problems accompanying it. This form of dialogue led to a new 
consciousness among the children themselves; they grew in confidence and approached their 
social environment – even their employers – with an increased awareness of their own rights. 
In addition to that, they knew contact points in the centers that supported them in enforcing 
their rights
97
.  
Another necessary condition for withdrawing children from the worst forms of child labor and 
providing them with basic education and health care services was to offer their adult family 
members alternative opportunities for income-generation. All of the cases that were 
considered here pursued such an approach. Reasons why children work are often related to 
poverty. In poverty contexts, children (not their parents) work under indecent conditions and 
with low salaries. According to the latest national child labor survey in Bangladesh, about 
93.3 percent of child laborers are occupied in the country’s informal economy98. 
Against this background, one component of the ILO/IPEC/Net offered mothers of children 
engaged in the worst forms of child labor micro-credits and courses to develop 
entrepreneurial skills to support their way into self-employment. With the help of this 
mechanism, they shifted dependence on household income from the children to the mothers. 
Eventually, the women engaged in renting out rickshaws, selling clothes and dishes on the 
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market, and printing or doing batik work with textiles. None of their children works anymore; 
they all became integrated in governmental primary or secondary schools. Women’s 
independent income-earning also led to a strengthening of their decision-making power and, 
therefore had an empowering effect on women’s rights as well. The example of the women’s 
group as one component of ILO/IPEC/Net demonstrates impressively how the mechanisms of 
income-generation and awareness-raising intertwine and mutually re-enforce each other.  
 
3.3 Actor Constellations 
In many developing countries, in which the state lacks the required capacities and resources to 
initiate rights implementation, actor partnerships can – at least temporarily – compensate 
certain state functions. Such actor constellations, in which state and non-state actors bundle 
their strengths, are known as public-private-partnerships (PPPs). To pursue common policy 
goals, partners mutually provide material resources, such as money, infrastructure or other 
goods, but also exchange immaterial resources, among them knowledge, expertise and 
information
99
. 
In Bangladesh, in five out of the seven cases considered, actor partnerships were built for 
realizing children’s rights. The only projects in which partnerships did not come into 
existence were the purely governmental FFE/PESP projects as well as the solely non-
governmental CLEP program. Especially when IOs belonged to the initiators of the projects, 
partnership-building played a central role. In these constellations, however, actors did not 
have the same rights in agenda-setting and in implementation. The partners also did not 
dispose of the same decision-making rights and their cooperation is not non-hierarchical.  
In contrast to what has been elaborated on PPPs
100
 so far, this case study demonstrates the 
emergence of hierarchical partnerships that do not grant the same power in decision-making 
to the respective actors involved. Instead, the actors initiating the programs, i.e. an IO or the 
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government, take over all responsibilities in planning, financing, administrating and 
monitoring. Local implementation tasks were conducted by NGOs.  
What is also different from what has been addressed in IR scholarship yet is the multi-level 
character of these actor constellations. Here, actors of different levels, i.e. international 
organizations, national governments and local NGOs, cooperate with each other. Multi-level 
actor partnerships are (temporarily) formed and each partner pursues its own, delineated scope 
of duties
101
.    
The example of ILO/IPEC/USDoL illustrates how cooperation in such a multi-level 
partnership is taking shape. To conduct this program, local NGOs had to submit a technical 
proposal according to the terms of references (ToRs) prepared by the ILO and approved by 
Bangladesh’s MoLE. The ToRs were published in daily newspapers to open a bidding 
process. Selection criteria included previous performance, professional expertise, and 
capabilities for providing non-formal education and skills training. On that basis, the ILO 
contracted NGOs to execute action programs
102
. Hence, NGOs became active at the field level 
as local implementers paid by the ILO: they took over home visits, any direct interaction with 
the beneficiaries, their parents and employers, and they formed the required community 
committees. They saw themselves in the role of a mediator taking over responsibilities in a 
process that transports norms of international conventions to the local rights-holders
103
. 
From this it follows that the most important empirical result of this case study at the actors’ 
level is that the state government has to ratify children’s rights norms but that implementation 
towards societal norm compliance – particularly in weak state contexts – is not always in the 
hands of the government alone. It delegates planning and decision-making competences to 
IOs that, with the help of external donors, also provide financial resources and technical 
expertise. The actual implementation processes, in particular direct interaction with the 
respective target group, can also be taken over by local NGOs. They have a key role in local 
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rights realization because they have privileged access to relevant communities. Here, they 
establish a new infrastructure and pertinent institutions; they install social mechanisms and act 
as a multiplier for raising the community’s consciousness of children’s rights. 
This interplay of (infra-)structure and institutions, social mechanisms and actor constellations 
involved will be summarized in a multi-level model of children’s rights implementation in 
weak states contexts in the following last chapter. 
 
4. Conclusion: A Multi-level Model for Children’s Rights Implementation 
This article has focused on how to comprehensively understand children’s rights 
implementation and how to overcome the discrepancy between global norm ambitions and 
local realities in the field of children’s rights. The central research question examined here 
was how global children’s rights norms become effective for their local targets. To answer 
this question, a multi-level governance framework was introduced and the following 
argument was developed: Current international children’s rights conventions are characterized 
by flexibilized principles providing Member States with ample scope for making national 
implementation decisions and taking the economic situation of developing countries into 
account. Hand in hand with this flexibilization came increasing ratification rates that – at least 
formally – indicate recognition of these norms. This formal acceptance has, however, in many 
countries not necessarily led to a comprehensive change of the children’s rights situation at 
the local level.  
In theoretical treatise on rights implementation, there are still desiderata when it comes to 
explaining how this discrepancy between global norms and local realities can be overcome. 
This is mainly due to the different foci of relevant scholarship. Norm research in IR mainly 
focuses on norm adoption (socialization literature) and on norm adherence (compliance 
literature) at the nation state level. Anthropological research and research on norm 
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localization, in contrast, concentrate on the local level without paying attention to the 
interplay between international, national and local actors and processes. Therefore, a multi-
level governance framework seems to be appropriate for understanding children’s rights 
implementation comprehensively. 
In the case study on Bangladesh introduced here, an emphasis was placed on understanding 
steps between national norm acceptance and local changes in the rights situation of children. 
Altogether, the realization of children’s rights can be grasped as a multi-level process as even 
local level implementation is influenced by multi-level policy programs and actor 
constellations. In the following, the new findings of the in-depth case study presented, will be 
integrated – in the form of hypotheses – into a multi-level model on children’s rights 
implementation in weak state contexts. These hypotheses supplement already existing 
findings from IR scholarship pertinent to the emergence of global norms and their acceptance 
by nation states. This categorization helps to understand the interplay at different levels of 
activities of respective steering mechanisms and participating actors. Moreover, it takes up the 
distinction between norm addressees (i.e. the ratifying state government) and norm targets 
(i.e. a state’s citizens), which is particularly relevant in human rights research. This allows for 
a more fine-grained differentiation pertinent to which actor is responsible (third column) for 
an implementation measure and whether this is directed at the norm addressees or the norm 
targets (fourth and fifth column).   
Global norms will continuously be created in the fora of IOs by respective state 
representatives. To realize them for the rights-holders, a national and a local implementation 
process need to be accomplished. Both processes are necessary to achieve compliance among 
the norm addressees, i.e. actors of the state government, and among the norm targets, i.e. the 
state’s population. The processes do not only differ with respect to what actors they are 
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directed at, but also regarding the social mechanisms applied and the political level at which 
they become effective.  
In the course of a national implementation process, state actors have to ratify international 
conventions and transport fundamental standards to national legislation and pertinent policy 
programs. Moreover, complaint mechanisms and monitoring procedures need to be installed. 
Their functioning – together with continuous norm-consistent discursive practices of the 
government – can be viewed as important steps for national implementation104. 
To progress with local implementation, particularly in weak states, an appropriate 
infrastructure and administrating institutions have to be established. In a next step, protective 
measures and social services need to be provided for the norm targets. Awareness raising and 
income-generating mechanisms usually support this process because they help the target 
group to actually make use of the services offered. Such mechanisms shall be installed by the 
responsible state department. If this lacks the required capacities, resources, expertise or 
access to the target group, it can cooperate with local NGOs and IOs. In these cases, NGOs 
can function as service providers but they depend on governmental funds, external funding or 
the channeling of funds through IOs. Their advantage, however, is that they often dispose of 
particular expertise in the provision of rights-relevant services and that they have strong ties 
to the local communities. In this way, they act as intermediary actors between state and 
society, and they can contribute to compensating governmental implementation deficits. But 
even the rights-holders themselves undertake implementation responsibilities at the local 
level: once they are persuaded of children’s rights, they engage in awareness raising 
themselves and act as multipliers within their own communities. In some cases, they even 
start initiating protective measures for other children and their families.  
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The following table 3 summarizes the hypotheses on local children’s rights implementation 
generated from this in-depth case study (supplementing already existing insights).    
Table 3: A Categorization of Children’s Rights Implementation as a Multi-level Process 
level implementation measure actors addressee target 
global norm creation IOs & governments government  
national ratification, making norms 
effective in national 
legislation and domestic 
policies 
IOs & government government  
local establishing local 
infrastructure & institutions 
IOs & government 
& local NGOs 
 rights-holders 
installing mechanisms 
(material mechanisms, i.e. 
income-generation & 
immaterial mechanisms, 
i.e. awareness raising)  
IOs & government 
& local NGOs & 
rights-holders  
 rights-holders 
effecting protective 
measures & rights-related 
services 
IOs & government 
& local NGOs & 
rights-holders 
 rights-holders 
 
Finally, two constraints to these results shall be briefly discussed. First, the study on 
Bangladesh introduced here is a single case study. The hypotheses generated in the course of 
the empirical analysis still have to be tested in other local contexts of other world regions in 
order to allow more generalizable claims. Thus, further research and case studies are needed. 
Second, all of the seven policy programs analyzed here are of a temporary nature. Hence, 
funding is usually dependent on external donor money and can only be secured within the 
limited time frame of project duration. Afterwards, the government is responsible for taking 
over the established infrastructure and for rights-relevant services. This means that multi-level 
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actor partnerships can only temporarily compensate local implementation deficits and state 
capacities need to be strengthened in the long run in order to achieve sustainability. 
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